

A N

Important SECRET

Come to Light.

OR, THE

STATES GENERAL's

REASONS

FOR

Refusing to Guaranty the *E*~~lect~~^{lection} of
H~~olland~~^{ague}, and to act offensively against
France in the *Netherlands*, as lately proposed
by the Ministers of *G. B.*

BEING

The Arguments used by Mynheer——— at
a Conference held the beginning of *October*
last at the *Hague*, with two *B*——*b* Noble-
men, justifying the *Neutrality* of the *United*
Provinces.


———*pro Republica semper.*

L O N D O N:

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Barl. 277



Barlyle request.

REASONS

FOR

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Important SECRET, &c.

* GENTLEMEN,

AFTER so many solid Reasons heretofore assigned by the Ministers of the *Republick* for not entering into any new *offensive Alliance* in so critical a Conjunction as the present, it would seem unnecessary to add any thing on the Subject: But since the uncommon Eagerness with which such an Alliance is still pressed, requires a clear and definite Answer, it becomes incumbent on those in the Direction of publick Affairs here, not only to give such a final Answer, but their Reasons at large for their Disinclination to the contracting any new Engagements that might precipitate the Republick into Measures of Violence and Expence, without any Views of advancing either the immediate Interest of their Country, or that of her *Hungarian Majesty*, whom it is insinuated the

A 2 proferred

* *Messieurs*, applied, in the *French* Language, equally to the Nobles and Commoners when used in publick Discourses.

proffered Alliance is calculated to support. The Deference due to the august Princes from whom the Overture comes ; and the high Esteem in which we hold the *noble Personage* last come to us upon the Errand, require that our Refusal of the Alliance in question should be so justified, as that not only the Nations immediately concerned, but all *Europe* may perceive the Rectitude of our Conduct, from the Force of our Reasons in support of it.

I am sorry, for many Reasons, that this arduous tho' necessary Task has been assigned to me ; who, of all my Colleagues, am the least qualified for a Disquisition of so delicate a Nature ; but that which heightens my Anxiety the most is, that I shall be obliged to speak *Truths*, which I could wish to be dispensed from speaking in the Presence of *some* whose Conduct I cannot approve of, as highly as I honour their Persons. But tho' the Nature of my Subject requires I should explain myself with Freedom, I shall carefully avoid all personal Reflection, a Caution, which, I am sorry to say, has not been observed with regard to the chief Ministers of the Republick, during the Course of this long Negotiation.

Tho' we *Dutchmen*, whether from Discretion or Phlegm, hold or seem to hold a deaf Ear to all Tale-Bearers, yet are not we the less acquainted with the secret *Calumnies* of them who make us openly the warmest Professions. But, Gentlemen, I hope to make it evident to the

World

World that no *French* Gold, the Dread of a *Stadtholder*, nor that of being *strip'd of Power*, have had any the least Influence on our Conduct in not chiming in with the *Views* of a neighbouring *Ministry*, who, if we may allow them to have any *Views* at all, are such only as regard their own *private Interest*. As my Intention is as general as my Expression, I hope none here present will do me the Injustice to arraign me of glancing at him in particular.

If from what I shall say on the Subject of the proposed *Alliance*, it shall appear to be destructive of the Tranquility, Trade and Interest of the Republick, I hope our Disapprobation of it won't be imputed to either the Influence or Gold of *France*. I won't take upon me to charge either the late or present Ministers of *L——n* with being *Pensioners* to that Crown; but I say, that they could not have served her more efficaciously had they tasted liberally of her Bounties. I believe none of this Company will dispute the implicit *Resignation* of all the *British* Ministers except the present, since the *Accession* of the present Royal Line, to the Desires, I may say, Commands of *France*. The Matter is too self-evident to be controverted: The only Doubt that remains is with regard to the present *Ministry*, who would be thought the Terror of *France* and the Champions of their own Country; but should it appear, as I hope to be able to make it, from the Conduct of the *new Ministry*, that they

they were no less under *French* Influence than the late, I may be allowed, that they of all Men had the least Right to charge others with being what the World takes themselves to be, either the *Dupes* or *Pensioners* of *France*. The Expression may be thought harsh; but it is by those only who are unacquainted with the late secret Arts made use of to irritate our Commonalty against their Superiors.

But the being Pensioners to *France* is not the only Charge industriously whispered against the Ministers of the Republick. The Dread of a *Stadtholder* is imputed to them as the most heinous Crime. How great have been the Pains, how refined the Address, to inspire the People, on this Head, with Sentiments injurious to the Honour and Probity of those in the Administration of our Affairs. They have been painted in such odious Colours as but too plainly shewed a second *unnatural Sacrifice* was recommended and expected.

However necessary such a Chief as a *Stadtholder* may have been deemed by our Ancestors in the Infancy of the Republick, I am neither ashamed nor afraid to declare that I am against vesting any Person with a Power, which, in its Nature, is inconsistent with the Freedom of a Commonwealth, unless it be in Cases of imminent Danger and Necessity, such as induced the Commonwealth of *Rome*, before it became viciated by the Arts and Wealth of Individuals, to delegate ample Power to a Dictator. It was the
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the Continuance of that *high Power* beyond the Danger, beyond the Time limited by the Constitution, which occasioned the Loss of *Roman Liberty*. Nor was the Continuance of the *Stadtholdership* in one Family like to be less destructive to the Liberty of this Republick. Our Annals bear witness of this Truth. How precarious was the Freedom of our Country when the Prince, *Stadtholder*, imprisoned six of the principal Members of the Republick, and attempted to surprize *Amsterdam*, and, failing, openly invested it with Troops intrusted to his Command for the Safety of that very Commonwealth which he attempted to oppose. Such is, and such always will be the Danger of delegating too great Power to an Individual; but of all Power, that of an Armed Force is the most dangerous, the Nature of Military Discipline being such, as subjects an Army implicitly to the Will of a Commander.

But if the Pretext for the oppressive Attempt upon our chief City, and the Confinement of our Chiefs in those Days be considered, it will be the less excusable. The only Crime alledged to the Magistrates of *Amsterdam* was, that they resolved upon a Reduction of the Land Forces, as being unnecessary and burthensome, and firmly opposed the Prince who would constitute them without Necessity, for Purposes of no Benefit to the Republick. The sudden Death of that Prince put an End at that Time to the dreadful Apprehensions of
our

our best Subjects concerning their Liberties; and the *Revolution* in *England* opened a new Channel for employing the Martial Genius of his Son and Successor.

Thus has Providence secured the *Freedom* of the Republick from two Dangers, which were but too obvious and imminent in the Days of our Fathers; but how unnatural would we their Sons be, should we a third Time risk the Liberties of Posterity in hopes of a third miraculous Deliverance? I shan't at this time enter into the personal Character of any particular Person; but certainly this * Letter in my Hand, which I am satisfied is not of *Dutch* Manufacture, proves but too evidently that there are Men who thirst to be above the Level of Subjects. I confess I am against all such Inequality from the Dread of the bad Use that might be made of it. And tho' in 1675 the late *Stadtholder* refused the Sovereignty of *Guelderland*, which the States of that Province unwisely and unfaithfully offered to him; yet it was but evident that the Prince would have been less passive, and had not hid himself, like *Saul*, if the other Provinces had been as liberal and obsequious. I am not inclined to trust the Freedom of my Country to the Caprice or Ambition of any Man, much less of one presuming on the Strength of an *Alliance* that certainly could

* Supposed to be a late Letter from the Prince of O——e to the *States General*, concerning their late Military Promotions.

could not have been calculated for cultivating the *Confidence* of the Republick.

The Dread of being strip'd of Power, or rather the Lust of Power, is the third Charge privately suggested against the Ministers of the Republick. They little know how greatly the *Tail* of Office in this Country exceeds the Emoluments that accrue from it, who arraign *Dutch* Ministers of Unfaithfulness to their Country in order to continue their Power. 'Tis not here as with those who secretly seek to discredit us with our Fellow-Subjects. We have no immense publick Revenue to count over a Gridiron; every Town in each Province having its own distinct Receivers; and the Revenue of each applied under their own particular Inspection. We have no immense *Civil-List* Revenue to dispose of in *corrupting* those, who in the different Cities and Provinces are the Guardians of public *Liberty* and the Trustees of the People. We have not such destructive Weapons put into our Hands by the Constitution to cut away the Virtue of our Countrymen or Freedom of our Country. There are no Salaries annexed to Employments here, that could tempt a Man to continue in Office, but with a View of serving his Country. The largest exceeds not † 10000 Guilders *per Annum*; and those of most of the eminent Employments

† About 1000*l.* Sterling.

ployments equal not that of many of your Office-Clerks in *England*. We have no Prince to make a Monopoly of; no Royal Ear to ingross; there is no room for Arts here to acquire the Confidence of the *Distributor* of all Employments Civil and Military. Here is no Court to be paid to the darling Passions of any one Magistrate. No *Avarice*, no Unsteadiness, no Weakness, no mistaken *Tenderness* is here to be indulged in order to acquire Power, or continue it when acquired.

No; few of us seek Employments; but if we do, 'tis with a View of serving our Country, not to accumulate Wealth at her Expence, and that of our own Honour and Conscience; and they are conferred by the Suffrage of a free, unbiass'd, unawed People, who expect no Returns but Patronism. Judge then, Gentlemen, if the Ministers of the Republick have any Motives weighty enough to wish to continue their Employments at the Expence of their Honour, or to the Disadvantage of their Country. Are there any such Benefits, and such Allurements in Office in this Country, as should induce a Man of ever so little Sense of Virtue to warp from the Duty of his Country, that he may continue his Influence. I call it *Influence* to distinguish it from *Power*; because in reality there is no such thing as Power lodged in any one *Subject* of this Commonwealth; and *Sovereign*, thank Heaven, we have one: And

as for *Influence*, if any of the Ministers have any, it arises solely from the Opinion conceived of their Probity and Wisdom.

From this short but faithful Portraiture of the Ministerial Function here, you may perceive the Justice of the *Odium* secretly endeavoured to be fixed upon those in the Administration of our Affairs, for supporting the Interest of the Republick, by those who can have no other View but the aggrandizing *One of our Fellow-Subjects*, perhaps at the Expence of the Lives of one or more of the *Ministers*, who may be supposed to stand in his Way to Power.—I have, perhaps, dilated longer on this Part of my Subject than might be agreeable, but not more amply than was necessary, from late secret Attacks on the Characters of the best and worthiest of our Fellow-Subjects.

'Tis an ungrateful Task to rake into the Misconduct of others, particularly of those whom one is inclined, for Interest as well as Choice, to think well of; but since speaking without Disguise is become of absolute Necessity in order to justify the Conduct on this Side of the Water, I hope I shall stand excusable, for what the Nature of my Subject requires I should consider with Plainness and Freedom. Here, was I inclined to lay open old Sores, I might prove from the several Gradations of *Misconduct* in the Cabinet of *L——n* since Queen *Anne's* Death, that the present Power of *France*, the *Inability* of this Republick, and
that

that of *B——n* itself, the Misfortunes of the Heirefs of *Austria*, and the Distractions of *Europe*, are not so much the Effects of Chance and *French* Politicks as of *B——b* Blunders and Corruption. Of the latter, I am satisfy'd the Ministers of this Republick may be acquitted; but I am sorry I cannot so justly acquit them of *Error* in embracing too implicitly many of the false Maxims of their *Neighbours* since the *Accessions*.

The late Ministers of the Republick, who alone are accountable for a mistaken *Deference* to the Cabinet of *L——n* in the late Reign, might be excusable for supposing that a new Family would take no Step to irritate or weaken the only *Powers* they could depend upon, much less court and aggrandize those whom they had most Reason to dread and guard against. Our late Statesmen might well be deceived in concurring with a Court whose Interest was now become the same with the Republick's. This was the Foundation they built upon in according to the *Quadruple Alliance*, and the Treaty of *Hanover*. Who could have imagined that a *false Affection* for a small *paternal Inheritance* would bias Princes, or seduce Men of Sense from the natural Interest of new, powerful, and mighty *Acquisitions*? But as it is often found, that no Maxim is more delusive than concluding that Men will act as it is their Interest they should act, we find our late Ministers implicitly concurring with the Court of *L——n*, on a
Supposition

Supposition that the natural Interest of *B——n* was the principal Object in view ; but, unhappily, our Countrymen were herein egregiously deceived. They might have observed a rooted *Tenderness* for *H——r* ; and a strong Passion for extending the *E——l* Territories. They might have perceived that the late *Head* of the Empire was to be weaken'd, that he might not have the Power to oppose the Extension of the *E——e* ; and that the Power and Wealth of *B——n* were to be made subservient to the Views of becoming so powerful in *Germany*, as to be able to dictate there in spite of the Emperor.

But the mistaken Prejudice of the Court of *L——n* in favour of *H——r*, was not the only Error which should have induced our late Ministers, had they observed it, to avoid the Snares laid for them. They might have perceived such a *servile Dread* of *France* rivetted on the Minds of the *New Comers*, as must necessarily throw the Balance of Power into her Hands. In short, they might have seen that every Measure of the Court of *L——n*, since the *A——n*, had a View to extending and enriching the Family *Inheritance*, or soothing and feeding the Vanity and Ambition of *France*.

These fatal Errors in the Maxims of the Court of *L——n*, however obvious they seem to us at this Time, must certainly have escaped the Notice of our late Ministers, on a Supposition that *British* Counsellors would not have adopted

adopted them if they had any Tendency injurious to the Interest of their Country. But alas! the most inexcusable Error committed by our late Ministers, was, that they mistook for *Judgment*, the slavish Submission of venal Men, who, in every Instance since the A——n, sacrificed the Interest of their Country, to private Gain and R——l Smiles.

Nay, my L——ds, tho' you are more polite than to interrupt me, I can perceive the extraordinary Emotions which my last Expressions have occasioned in your Breasts. Have I advanced any Thing in Disfavour of your *Ministers* of the late Reign, that their Conduct does not justify? Shall I enumerate their Treaties; their Conventions for foreign Troops and Subsidies; their Quarrels with *Sweden*, the *Emperor* and *Spain*; their mean Obsequiousness to *France*? Shall I mention the numerous Instances in which they sacrificed the Interest of their Country to that of a *foreign Concern*? Shall I shew for what vile Purposes, and with what dangerous Views, they had projected and obtained Laws that hourly endanger the Freedom of a brave People? Shall I assign their Reasons for continuing the National *Debt*, the excessive Burden of *Taxes*, and for encreasing the Revenue and Power of the Crown? My L——ds, if I descend to a minute Disquisition of the Conduct of your late *Ministers*, you will perceive that I have hitherto been more tender of
 them

them than they deserved from all true Friends of G. B——n.

I wish that the Ministers of the late Reign were the only whose Conduct has raised the just Indignation of all Wel-wishers to the Liberties of B——n in particular, and those of *Europe* in general. When *Britain* is free, the Liberties of *Europe* are safe; but can we say that her late *Minister*, who had directed her Cabinet half the late Reign and all the present till lately, designed that his Country should enjoy that ample *Freedom* which is necessary she should, to secure the general *Freedom* of *Europe*? No, the most sanguine of his Advocates must own that he intended to raise a *despotick* Power on the Ruins of the Constitution of his Country, or that he blundered on, like a loaded Mule, ignorant of what he was about, or how far he was to go. And tho' we on this Side the Water never held him for a Genius of the first Class, yet I am inclined to think that his Conduct has been owing more to *Design* than Ignorance. His Administration was too much of a Piece, too uniform not to have been the Work of *Design*. He seemed to have acted upon the Plan of his immediate Predecessor, who, without dispute, intended to raise the Power of the *Crown* and impoverish and enslave the Subject.

If this was not the Plan by which the late *Minister* shaped his Conduct; if he did not intend, or was not suspected of, intending to extend

tend the Royal, or rather the Ministerial Power, at the Expence of the Subject, why was he so constantly and warmly opposed by *those* who are now cloathed in his ministerial Garments? To say that they opposed only with a View of grasping the Power which he should be forced to drop, would be thinking very meanly of their Honour; and to say they opposed out of Spleen and Revenge, would be judging as meanly of their Probity and Charity. So that, in Charity to the late *Minister's* Opponents, or rather to that whole People to whom he was become odious, we must suppose that he intended to erect *Despotism* in Violation of the antient Constitution of his Country.

But what need we have recourse to Suggestions or Suspicions with regard to the Intentions of that great *Favourite*, when there are so many *Overt-Acts* to prove that he premeditatedly designed to strip his Countrymen of their *Wealth and Freedom*; of the *first*, to break their high Spirits, the better to fit them to bear the Loss of the *latter*; and of *this*, to perpetuate his own Power by extending that of the Crown beyond the reach of the Laws.

They who can have any doubt that the late *Minister* designed the *impoverishing* and *enslaving* his Country, the better to make his own C——t and secure his Power, would oblige the World in assigning any other Motives for his whole Conduct. Had not he intended to *impoverish* his Country, would he have discour-
ged

ged her Industry by unnatural Restraints, or continued the excessive Weight of her *Taxes* during a twenty Years Tranquility? Would he have openly opposed or secretly eluded every Proposal for the Discharge of the weighty *Debt* which sinks the Credit and Power of the Nation?

The *English* Ministry do not, or perhaps will not see that this unequal Load is and always must be a Draw-back upon the Credit or Influence of their Country while she continues to be burthened with it. What Nation in *Europe* can reckon on *Britain's* supporting a War against *France* with the necessary Vigour, while she groans under the Weight of fifty Millions sterl. of Debt? However drain'd and impoverish'd *France* has been painted of late in *Memorials* and *Speeches*, we in these Provinces are too well acquainted with her natural and artificial Strength, not to dread that she will, as in her late Wars, when she had all *Europe* for Enemies, be able to wage a ten or twelve Years War, if ever she should be forced into one, by either one or both the Maritime Powers. In such case, what must become of *Britain*, that Power which is expected will always bear the greater Part of the Expences of such a War; what, I say, must be her Condition then, if even now all *Europe* see her droop under the Weight of her present Debts, Taxes, and the Decay of her Trade and Industry? A *French* War must as necessarily oc-

caſion a Decrease of her Commerce, as an Increase of her Debts and Taxes. In ſuch a Situation, how feeble her Efforts in the general Cauſe of Liberty; how miſtaken would they be who ſhould reckon upon her being able to defray her Proportion of the Expences of a War, which the Miſconduct of her *Cabinet* had brought upon all *Europe*? Is it not more natural to ſuppoſe, that that once mighty and powerful State would become *Bankrupt* in the Courſe of ſo long and expenſive a War as that with *France* would neceſſarily be? Would not this be more likely, than that ſhe would be able to maintain ſo vigorous a War with that Crown as might induce her to ſue for Peace with Humility, as in the Days of *Q. Anne*?

I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to obſerve upon the Motives which I think induce the Court of *L—n* to appear at preſent ſo violently earneſt to enter into a War with *France*; but in the mean time let me take Notice, that the late *Minifter* ſeemed to have had a View of enfeebling this Republick as well as his own Country. We thank him, and his *M—r*; he took us into his Scheme of Poverty and Subjection; and might have ſucceeded, had not the Steadineſs of our preſent Miniſters here, and his Opponents there baffled his Imaginations. 'Tis to the blind Concurrence of our late Miniſters in that *Favourite's* Schemes that one may aſcribe thoſe frequent Augmentations of Forces and other extraordinary and unneceſſary Expences,

Expences, which we feel at present. 'Tis to his Councils that we owe those *intestine Convulsions* which have of late Years been a Clogg upon the Operations of our Cabinet. Some of our poorer Provinces being wrought upon to cry out for a *Master*, the late B——b Minister was willing we should all bow to an Idol of his chusing. But as this particular Point has been hinted at before, I just mention it now to shew that this Republick as well as his own Country was taken into that Minister's general Scheme.

Had that sheltered *Favourite* continued much longer in Power, 'tis scarce to be doubted that he would have brought all his Schemes to Perfection. For where a Minister has the Disposal of an immense Revenue, of innumerable Employments, and has the Sanction of an immoveable M——r, and a courtly P——t, what is it that he dare not undertake, and may not be able to perfect? Happy had it been for his own Country in particular, this Republick, and for the rest of the Powers in *Europe* that wish to be free, had that powerful enterprizing Minister directed his Schemes as much for general Happiness as he did for general Misery and Servitude!

Upon Recollection, I don't know but I might have been guilty of a Breach of Charity in imputing to that great Man all the Misconduct of the Cabinet which he was supposed to direct. For tho' it be criminal to concur in

destructive Measures, yet as there are Degrees of Guilt, he who only concurs, can't be deemed as highly criminal as he who lays the Plan and directs. If therefore the great *Delinquent* was under any Controul, he may be looked upon as an Accessary rather than a Principal; and tho' by the Civil Law there are no Accessaries, in Cases of Homicide all are Principals; 'tis not so in Treason, either against a single Magistrate or the State. In these Cases, the *first Mover* is the most obnoxious.

If then the *Favourite* was obliged to steer by the Lights set up by his immediate Predecessors in the Administration; if he was compell'd to walk in the Path chalked out for him, he was guilty, but not superlatively so. He was criminal for stooping to *addresses*, or shrinking at *Frowns*; he was guilty for having soothed the *Passions* of any Man or Men in violation of his Allegiance to his Country, or Regard to the Freedom of Mankind, but still he is less guilty than——

The *Successors* to that great Man's Power may possibly, on the Strength of this Strain of reasoning, plead the same Excuse in bar of any Exceptions which may be taken to their Conduct since he has laid down. But their own *Opposition* to the late Minister's Administration, cuts away all ground of Excuse for their shaping their Conduct by his. They professed to have founded their *Opposition* solely on his Misconduct: They upbraided him, and but too justly

justly I fear, with corrupting the Legislature, squandering the Revenue, and misemploying the Strength of the Nation; with gratifying particular *Passions* and unsafe *Affections*; with preferring trivial *Foreign Concerns* to the most important Interest of his Country; with promoting a Standing Army, coercive Laws; and with yielding to every *Desire*, and bending before every *Ruffle* of a Mind determined to be obeyed.

These, and many more Crimes built upon the same Foundation were imputed to that *Minister* by his *Opponents*. But should they, upon their Accession to his Power, embrace all his Maxims, tread the same Steps, blacken themselves with all his Crimes, they would be the most unpardonable of any Set of Men living: The late Minister would be far less criminal, tho' both were guilty of the same Crime. The Addition of *Hypocrisy* would sink them far below him in Guilt.

What has been fortuitously said of the late *Minister* and his *Succeffors* seems to exact from us some Enquiry into the Conduct of the latter, by way of Comparison. It would be ungenerous to draw out at full length the Portraiture of one without attempting at least to etch out the Out-lines of the Picture of the others. But besides this Consideration, the Purport of our meeting here to Day requires that we should consider the Conduct of *Ministers*, who so earnestly urge us to enter into new
Contracts

Contracts which threaten the Ruin of our Republick. If I advance any Thing without a colourable Foundation, here are *those* who can set me right. Far from taking such Correction amiss, I shall look upon it as a Mark of Friendship and Esteem. As my sole View in this Discussion is to justify the present Conduct of the Republick, I shall not need to have Recourse to Falshood, because from *Truth* alone I can borrow enough to answer my Purpose.

When the late Minister resigned, how were the Affairs of *Europe* circumstanced? What was the State of the domestick Affairs of his Country? After we have taken a cursory View of these Points, we will cast an Eye to the present State of Affairs both at Home and Abroad. Thus shall it be seen whether or no Errors have been rectified and Matters have been meliorated.

With the last Year ended, I think, that Minister's publick Influence; his *Successors* best know if he still retains any. At that Time the *French* Army under *Maillebois*, which had been *invited* to countenance the famous *Neutrality* for *H——r*, was still upon our Frontiers to awe and intimidate us, much more than the *E——e*. Of the Passiveness of that *State* the Court of *France* was secure; but was jealous of this Republick; and not caring to proclaim her Jealousy, took *H——r* into her Scheme for covering her Design. At that Time also, did the Distractions in *Upper Germany* subsist; tho' it was evident, that it would
not

not be difficult to reconcile the Courts of *Berlin* and *Dresden* to that of *Vienna*. Had we taken the sole Mediation upon us, 'tis probable that all the Differences of these Courts had ended before the Year ; but having imprudently *associated* with * * * no wonder that we succeeded no better.---Old Sores are not easily healed ; nor old, and just *Demands* satisfied by bare Professions. Let not, however, the ill Success of his Country's Mediation in this Instance be imputed to the late *Minister*. The Cause lies deeper, as most Causes of great National Mis-carriages generally do. The Publick, often, see but the Superficies of Things ; and seldom fix upon the right Object.

With regard to *France*, she went on slowly to fulfil her Engagements with the Elector of *Bavaria* ; and the late *Minister*, who was obliged to act on the *Plan* handed down to him, *suppllicated* underhand, tho' he affected to bounce and bully above board. But was there any Thing new in this Conduct ? Was it not consistent with the stated Family *Maxim*, constantly practised from the A——n to that Time, and since ? The War with *Spain* was carried on with the greater Indolence and an enormous Expence. We shall soon see if his *Successors* have been less prodigal and more active. In *Italy*, the *Spaniards* had got some Footing by B——h Indolence, Cowardice, or Perfidy ; but the King of *Sardinia*'s Interest inducing him to confederate with the Queen
of

of *Hungary*, there was no Reason to apprehend any ill Consequences from the vague Schemes of the Court of *Madrid*.

As for this Republick, tho' the late *Minister* paid her not so open Court, nor was so lavish of his Professions to her, as his *Successors*; yet I must say in his Behalf, that if he did not behave towards her with so great Politeness and Ceremony, he was not less candid and sincere. If she found him no Courtier, she could not prove him a *Hypocrite*.

But it is needless to discant more minutely on the Situation of foreign Affairs at the time when that *Minister* laid down; there is none here can be ignorant of it! 'Tis more to our Purpose to take a View of Affairs as they stand at present.

The *new Ministry* were no less esteemed Abroad than at Home. Their Ability was not doubted, and their Virtue nor so much as suspected. They had the Hearts of their Countrymen with them, and the Wishes of all *Europe*, except the Partizans of *France*. So pleased were we here in *Holland* with the Change in *London*, that publick Rejoicings had been made on the Occasion if some of our more moderate Magistrates had not thought them indecent, as being obliquely reflecting on the *Judgment* of one whose Character they were tender of. Great Men seldom make a wrong Choice; but if they do, they soon rectify their Error. *Resolution* in some often degenerates

generates to *Obstinacy*, and then ceases to be a Virtue.

The Eyes of all *Europe* were upon the *Suc-
cessors* of the removed Minister. *France* trem-
bled that so powerful a neighbouring Nation
should be wisely *conducted* and become *united*,
as there was scarce a Doubt that they would
by their new *Leaders*. *Spain* began to repent
that she had formed any Schemes on *Italy*;
look'd upon the Troops she had transported
thither by the Connivance of B——n, as a Sa-
crifice to the Resentment of the new Ministry:
and shuddered for *America*, and even for the
Two Sicilies. *Prussia* wished he had not over-
acted the Hero; and *Saxony*, that he had not
engaged so deeply with *France*. The Duke of
Bavaria wished that his Ambition had been
more moderate; and he and all the other *Ger-
mans* confederated with *France* repented them
of their Credulity: Nor was *Sweden* less anxi-
ous for having confided too implicitly in *French*
Professions. In short, every Prince, every State that
had been inveigled into the Schemes of *France*
was in dread that new salutary Measures in the
Cabinet of L——n would be the certain Con-
sequence of the late Minister's Removal.

The independent Friends of universal *Free-
dom*, on the other hand, expected a *Change of
Measures* in E——d; but far from dreading
any evil Consequences that could attend such a
Change, they doubted not that it would tend
to the cementing such an Alliance as must have
a View to stopping the Carrier of *France* and
secure

secure the *Liberties* of *Europe*. The Queen of *Hungary* was the most sanguine in her Hopes, as she was nearest to Danger. The King of *Sardinia*, who dreaded to be hemmed in between the different Branches of the House of *Bourbon*, dated his Security from the Fall of a Minister whom all *Europe* had believed to have been devoted to or always in Dread of *France*. But we of these Provinces out-went all others, in hopes that we might now safely rely on the Wisdom, Steadiness and Integrity of a *Cabinet*, which we could not reckon upon for upwards of twenty Years before. We saw *France* extending her Power; and we saw the Necessity of checking her Ambition, but could not with any Hopes of Success enter into any Measures for the Purpose, whilst the late *Minister* presided over the Councils of the only Nation in *Europe* most capable of aiding in the glorious Design.

But now the Scene was changed: We saw a Set of Men rise to Power that had for many Years profess'd to have *opposed* the late Minister, solely on Account of his Misconduct at Home, his Subserviency to *France*, and his Neglect of all the natural Allies of his Country. As from such Men all that was great and glorious might have been expected, no Wonder that we were as sanguine in our Hopes of their Conduct as all their own Fellow-Subjects were. They might have influenced us here as easily as their own Countrymen; and might have as readily brought us into *Alliances* as they commanded the

the *Treasure* of their own Nation : Such was the high Opinion conceived here, as well as at home, of their Virtue and Abilities.

But how delusive are Hopes built upon the *Probity* of Men ! Scarce had we the pleasing News of the Advancement of the late *Opponents*, but we had Advice that they *capitulated* before they were advanced ; that they were not only to secure the Retreat of the *late Minister*, but embrace his *Maxims*, and steer as he should direct from behind the Curtain. Tho' this Piece of Intelligence came confirmed to us from those whose Fidelity we had no Reason to suspect ; yet were we slow, and I the slowest of all my Colleagues, in believing any thing so injurious to the Characters of *rising Statesmen*. I could not suppose that Men would truckle to a Man unable to maintain his Ground : a Man, whom they had beat almost out of the Field ; a Man despised by all *Europe*, and hated by all his own Countrymen. I could not believe that Men of Sense would stoop to *Drudgeries* for the Sake of precipitating their Flight into Posts and Employments, which must necessarily have fallen into their Hands in a few Days in spite of the C——t. I was however mistaken. I too fondly supposed that sensible Men would act as it became them to do.——Mistaken Notion ; particularly with regard to a *neighbouring Nation* ! To judge of them with any Certainty, in their political Capacity, the safest Way is to suppose

suppose they will always act in direct *Opposition* to the true Interest of their Country.

I confess much Asperity to be in so general a Charge ; but am I not warranted in the Support of it ? Have the several *Ministries* of that Kingdom for *thirty Years* past, acted in any one Affair of Moment, either foreign or domestick as they ought ? But particularly the present *Ministry*, is there a single Instance to this Hour of their having made one virtuous or judicious Step ? With regard to Home, they have lost the intire Confidence of their Fellow-Subjects by skreening the *Object* of their Hatred, embracing his Maxims, and pursuing directly his Measures. Have they not herein acted diametrically contrary to the Dictates of Sense and Reason ?

The Ambition of *France* and the Distraction on the Continent required *domestick Unanimity*, without seeing which confirmed, the States of *Europe* could not safely rely on the *Alliance* of *B—n*. But what have the *new Ministry* done to procure this necessary *Union* between the Head and the Members, and between the Members amongst themselves ? They have acted so as to increase the *Jealousy* of the People, and the *Diffidence* of the P—. They are not pleased, nor probably does he think he has more Reason for being so. When general *Discontent* appears, as was the Case in the late Administration, it may be construed *Disaffection*. It might have been the private Interest of the late Minister to inculcate such *disuniting* Notions, but certainly it was not that of the *new Ministers*,

Ministers, who had every thing to hope, and nothing to fear from the *Union* of the P— and People. They had the People, at least the Bulk of them, on their Side to a Man, which naturally, I may say necessarily, would in time produce the *Confidence* of the P—. But by losing the first, how can it be thought they can secure the latter?

Upon the footing of *Self-Interest*, it seems strange that the *new Ministry* would not cultivate the good Opinion the People were willing to entertain of them. The Repeal of a few Laws which restrain their *Liberties*, and promoting a few that might secure them hereafter, would have so riveted the *new Ministry* in the Hearts of the Public, as would make it dangerous to remove them should the C——t ever intend it. But it seems to have been a constant Maxim since the A—n for Ministers to secure their Influence at the Expence of the People.

As the *new Ministry* worked on the Plan of the late *Minister*, with regard to domestick Affairs, they varied but little from his Scheme in regard to foreign Affairs. Some Variation was absolutely necessary to cover their secret *Subserviency*, and give some Colour to their Administration. To this End, the *Admiral* that had been pacifickly instructed for three Years in the *Mediterranean* was recalled, and one more active put in his Room. But what has he been ordered to do, or what has he done that shews the

the new Ministry to have varied materially from the late Minister's Plan? The burning a few old Gallies at *St. Tropez*, and visiting a few *French* Ships for Plunder, proves not so strongly that *Measures* had been changed with *Hands*, as the *Neutrality* at *Naples* proves they were not.

The formal Manner of compelling the Court of *Naples* to this *Neutrality* was told the World in pompous Language; but who was so weak as to be imposed upon by the empty Sound of Words in contradiction to his Understanding? Except it be some deluded *E—b—men*, there are none in *Europe*, unconvinced at this time, that the *Neutrality* of the *Sicilies* had been concerted before the Resignation of the late Minister, and was to have been executed whenever the *Spaniards* should be pushed in *Italy*. As nothing but such a *Neutrality* could save the Court of *Naples*, 'tis beyond all doubt that it was hatch'd at *Versailles*, seconded at *Dresden*, and complaisantly executed by Orders from *L——n*.

The *Farce* has been carried on likewise at the Court of *Turin*, and a large *Subsidy* agreed to, tho' it be manifest that *Self-preservation* would have secured his *Sardinian* Majesty in the Interest of the Heirefs of *Austria*; and that the Money laid out with him had been more usefully employed in *Germany*, since the Safety of *Don Carlos* was previously stipulated. *Five hundred thousand Pounds* were granted for the Use of the *Queen of Hungary*, and *seven Mil-*
lions

lions sterling for maintaining or rather recovering the Balance of Power, after the Abdication of the late Minister ; these Sums, properly employed, were sufficient to drive not only the *French* but all their Partizans out of the Empire. The poor Queen of *Hungary* did Wonders considering the Succour she has had from her boasting Friends. The vast Sum granted for her Use particularly, being dissipated in useless *Subsidies* at *Turin*, *Berlin* and *Dresden*, can no more be said to be applied as it should be, than the *seven Millions* granted for supporting her and the *Liberties* of *Europe*.

But it will be urged, I suppose, in favour of the *new Ministry*, that the Desertion of the King of *Prussia* from the *Emperor* and *France*, and his Reconciliation to the Queen of *Hungary*, were so useful and refined Strokes of Policy, as should atone for any Mistakes they might have been guilty of. This Point has been extravagantly exaggerated, as indeed most Things are, on the other Side the Water. Had not the Queen of *Hungary* relied too far on *B—b* Friendship and Promises, she might have gained over the King of *Prussia* four Months sooner, and on much easier Terms. She has parted with more of the fair Province of *Silesia* than would have contented him earlier ; and has not obtained as full Concessions in return, as she might while the *Mediation* was partly in our Hands. But the Purposes of *B—n*, or rather *H—r*,

H——r, would not be so well answered if better Conditions had been obtained for the Court of *Vienna*. If less of the rich Province of *Silesia* had been wrested from the deluded Queen of *Hungary* for his *Prussian* Majesty, the latter had not readily agreed to a *Guaranty* for the E — e of *H——r*, nor to an *Abatement* of the great Sum he claimed in virtue of *testamentary Donations*.

Never has any Transaction been more magnified, than this of the King of *Prussia's* Neutrality, by the Partizans of the new *British* Ministry; and never has any been less understood by the *English* in general. It was no Secret to us here in *Holland*, and I believe none at *L—n* and *Vienna*, that the ambitious young King had been encouraged by *France* and *Bavaria* to invade *Silesia*, as such a Step must have answered the Purposes of the latter in a double manner. Should the Court of *Vienna* refuse contenting the House of *Bavaria*, the *Prussian* Invasion of *Silesia* would facilitate the Elector's Designs on *Bohemia*, by dividing the *Austrian* Forces; or would oblige the Queen of *Hungary* to agree with the Duke of *Bavaria* in order to fall upon the Invader of *Silesia* with all her Might.

We did not fail, long before the *French* Auxiliaries passed the *Danube* in favour of *Bavaria*, to represent at the Court of *Vienna* the Necessity of giving immediate Satisfaction to either the Courts of *Berlin* or *Munich*. And we give
it

it as our Opinion that the latter ought to be contented preferable to the former ; for this Reason, that by gratifying *Bavaria* the *French* would necessarily retire out of *Germany*, which would give the *Queen* of *Hungary* an apparent Advantage over *Prussia*, by having no other to deal with, and by having the future *Head* of the Empire on her Side. Besides, as *Silesia* is the richest of all the *Austrian* Dominions in the Empire, it would have been the Interest of the *Queen* to part with one or both the *Austrias*, or even *Bohemia* rather than with that valuable Province. The Court of *Vienna* saw very plainly the Force of our Representations, and would willingly have followed our Advice ; but the Court of *L——n* found means to traverse all our Endeavours, and force out again the young *Queen* into a tempestuous Sea, after we had brought her to the very Mouth of an Harbour, where she and her Family might, in all human probability, be easy and safe for ever.

'Tis hard to guess why the Court of *L——n* took so great Pains and was at so very great Expence to alter such healing Resolutions as we had inspired the Court of *Vienna* with. The *Queen* would be more powerful by being Mistress of *Silesia*, than by possessing one or both the *Austrias*, or *Bohemia*. But the *Elect*or of *Bavaria* would have been contented with the *Tyrolese* and the *Forrest Towns*, which never can add much to the Power of the House of *Austria*.

Aria. Therefore the Views of the Court of *L——n* could not be to strengthen the *Queen*, her Power being obviously lessen'd by agreeing with *Prussia* preferable to *Bavaria*, on our Scheme. We must then seek for some other Foundation for the Conduct of *B——n* in this Instance.

The Duke of *Bavaria*, who is truly a *German*, would have been glad to have a fair Pretext for thanking *France* for her Succours, and sending her Troops out of the Empire; and therefore would have been reconciled to the Court of *Vienna* on moderate Terms. But this was not perhaps the Views nor Interest of *France*: She might have thought the Juncture favourable for obliging the *Germans* to destroy one another, at a small Expence on her Side. In this View, she could not approve of the Willingness of the Court of *Munich* to be reconciled to that of *Vienna*; but could not, with any Decency, oppose it publicly. How else then, so well as by means of the Court of *L——n*, could *France*, without being suspected, destroy our Plan, by which the Courts of *Vienna* and *Munich* were so willing to act? I admit that this Suggestion supposes the Influence of *France* to be great at the Court of *L——n*. But does not the whole Conduct of the *new* as well as *late* Ministry prove the Weight of *French* Influence in the *B——h* Cabinet?

If we suppose the Court of *L——n* uninfluenced by *France*, on this Occasion, we must necessarily

farly impute her Conduct to Motives of Self-Interest. When I say, *Self-Interest*, I don't mean the Interest of *B—n*, but that of *H—r*, which has been, ever since the *A—n*, the only Interest at the Heart of the *B——b* Ministry. Let us see how the Conduct of the Court of *L——n* will appear on a Supposition that it may have been deem'd for the particular Interest of *H——r*, or the *new Ministry*, that the Court of *Vienna* should prefer accommodating rather with the King of *Prussia* than the Elector of *Bavaria*.

Had the Elector of *Bavaria* been contented as early as he might, if our Plan had been pursued, the King of *Prussia* would be soon obliged to restore the Tranquility of the Empire by retiring willingly or being forced out of *Silesia*. Without any doubt, *Prussia*, singly, is no Match for the Queen of *Hungary*. But had this happen'd, it may have been dreaded that the disappointed Invader of *Silesia*, would recompence himself at the Expence of another *Neighbour*, to whom he had a juster Claim than to the Queen of *Hungary*. Besides, had not our healing Negotiation been traversed, the Demands of *Prussia* in virtue of *Wills* and *Codicils*, could not be compounded on so good Terms as they are at present, nor the *Electorate* guaranty'd.

But it would by no means answer the Views of the Cabinet of *L—n*, that Tranquility should be restored in the Empire. The Pretext for levying *Millions*, and keeping up a great

great *Land Force* of *Natives* and *Foreigners*, would be taken away by Peace in *Germany*. For this last Reason, supposing *French Influence*, and the particular Interest of *H ——— r* out of the Question, 'tis no wonder that so great Pains has been taken, and so great Treasure employed, not only in preventing the Reconciliation of the Courts of *Munich* and *Vienna*, but in fomenting their Animofities and Quarrels.

I have dwelt the longer on this boasted *Coup—d'Eclat* of the new Ministry, because I have observed that few Tranfactions had been generally leſs underſtood. I don't know whether I have been ſo happy as to clear up the Matter to the Satisfaction of this Company; but ſure I am, that whoever will be at the Pains of examining it with Caution, will be of Opinion with me, that the Conduct of the *new Ministry*, far from deſerving Applauſe for the Treaty of *Breſlau*, merit the ſevereſt Censure from all the true Friends of the *House of Auſtria*, and *Germany* in general.

Whilſt I am upon this Part of my Subject, let me obſerve that the ſame ſtrain of Politicks ſtill engroſs'd the Attention of the *new Miniſtry*, when they obſtructed the Evacuation of all *Bohemia* by the *French* laſt Summer. All *Europe* were juſtly ſurprized that the Court of *Vienna* would reſuſe agreeing to the Propoſals of the *French* Generals before *Prague* was beſieged in form. It was obviously the Intereſt of the *Queen of Hungary* to get rid of the *French*

French and get Possession of all *Bohemia*. But probably, it was not the immediate Interest of *those* who had instructed their *Minister* at *Vienna* to obstruct all Accommodation with the Court of *Francfort*. That the March of Marshal *Maillebois* to the *Danube* was owing to the unwise Tenaciousness of the Court of *Vienna*, is beyond all Controversy ; nor is it less certain that Mr. R———n had no small Share of the Glory of cooping up two Marshals of *France* within Walls, that to this Hour had never been battered.

Strange Policy ! to raise with one Hand and pull down with the other ! And yet this is actually the Case with the Cabinet of L———n in regard to the Queen of *Hungary*. Large, very large Sums of Money have been granted for her Support, both last Year and the present : And I will suppose that best Part of the Money has or ought to have been remitted to her. This has the Air of Friendship, and of sound Policy. But what shall we call the early Obstruction of a Reconciliation between that Princess and the Elector of *Bavaria* ? What shall we name the obstructing the Evacuation of *Bohemia* by the *French* ? or, What can we think of the *Neutrality* of *Naples*, which must have fallen into the Queen's Hands, considering the Discontent of the Inhabitants and the secret Intelligence of the Court of *Vienna*, had the *British* Fleet assisted in the concerted Designs of the King of *Sardinia* and Count *Traun* ?

But

But to carry this Chain of Thought still farther ; how can the Court of *L——n* justify her Friendship to the Queen of *Hungary*, when, instead of employing the *Foreign Troops* in her Pay, in pursuing *Maillebois* to the *Danube*, or otherwise joining the *Austrians* in *Bohemia*, she marches her *Hanoverians* and *Hessians* into the *Netherlands*, where it was never designed they should be of any Service to the Queen of *Hungary*? The first and second Neutrality for *H——r*, were further Instances of the good Intentions of the Court of *London* towards the unhappy Princess, who confides with too great Implicitness in certain *Masked Friends*.—To put an end to this part of my Subject, I must insist upon it, that the Conduct of *B——n*, since the late Emperor's Death, proclaims her *Ministers* to be either *F——ls* or *V——ns*. The first, in not discerning the true Interest of their Country ; and the second, in seeing but not pursuing it in Compliment to *Foreigners*. Should Objections be made to the Bluntness of my Assertions ; let those be blamed, who have laid us under a necessity of speaking without Veil or Disguise. The Stabs pointed at our Characters in secret, merit a severer Return than I make.

I could shew, from the Negotiations of the Cabinet of *L——n* at the Courts of *Russia*, *Sweden*, *Denmark* and *Italy*, since the Dismission of the late *B——sh* Minister, that the same Measures are still pursued, with very little

tle Variation ; but as all the discerning Foreigners of *Europe*, as well as his own Countrymen, seem not to doubt the late Minister's secret *Influence*, I shall chuse to wave this Disquisition, in order to shew that there can be no Safety in confederating with a Nation, whose Ministers are known to sacrifice, constantly, the Interest of their Country to private Gain.

The Conduct of the *late Minister*, brought upon him the *Odium* of his own Fellow-Subjects ; and lost his Country the *Confidence* of her best and faithfullest foreign Friends. The Conduct of the *new Ministry* has not gained them the Affections of their Fellow-Subjects ; nor to their Country, the Confidence of Foreigners. If the late Minister's *Measures* had not been injurious to the Freedom and Interest of his own Countrymen and Foreigners, he had not been so universally hated ; and if the *new Ministers* had not pursued the same *Measures*, they had certainly recovered the Affection and Confidence which their Predecessor lost. But the Conduct of both being the same, 'tis no wonder that both meet with the same Disaffection at Home, and Disesteem Abroad.

We, of this State, could never treat with Safety, with *B——n*, because we could not put intire Confidence in her, whilst the *late Minister* presided over her Councils. For the same Reason we can't treat with her at present, because, seeing she pursues the same Measures as in the late Minister's Administration, we can see

see no Reason for entertaining a more favourable Opinion of her now than when he was at Helm. If the *B——b* Ministry had the *Interest* of *B——n* as *much* at Heart, and that of *H——r* as *little* as they ought, there might be Safety in treating with them. The Interest of *B——n* and these *Provinces* must always be the same. It can never be different, but when either or both are cursed with unnatural *Conductors*. Such will always make and proclaim a Difference of Interest, for the same Reason that they would persuade a Prince that he has a separate Interest from his People. *Sycophants* always find their Account, or think they do, in sowing Jealousies and Animosities.

But tho' the Interest of *B——n* and this *State* be the same, I am not quite so clear that *H——r* stands in the same Light, or has the same Right to our Attention; for which Reason I should think it as imprudent for us to enter into a Treaty for *Guarantying* the *E——e*, as it is improper for a *British* Minister to make the Overture of such a *Guaranty*. Does not this Overture prove what I have said of the extraordinary Regard had to the Interest of *H——r* at the Court of *L——n*? Does it not prove the unsafe Obsequiousness of *British* Ministers?

But why are we pressed on this Head at this time? What Danger is the *E——e* in, that should occasion such Warmth as this Overture is pressed with? Not from any Dread of the *French* Army on the Borders, I am sure,

sure. They are marched to the *Danube*, and *Maillebois's* Hands were certainly tied up, by a prudent *Neutrality*, even whilst he was at hand. Therefore there can be no Danger nor Apprehension from that Quarter. To be plain then we apprehend some *secret Policy* to be couched under this pretended Dread of the Neighbourhood of *French* Forces on the Borders of the Electorate and this State.

The *Guaranty* proposed would necessarily include the late *Electors* Acquisition of *B—n* and *V—n*, to which the lawful Proprietors, the *Swedes* never gave their Consent. That Nation is now armed; but as the War between them and *Russia* will very likely be soon at an end, it may be apprehended they won't disarm till they attempt making themselves whole in *Germany* for their Losses in *Finland*. But if the *Swedes* should not think it seasonable to take such a Step when *Germany* is in flames, which is not very likely, they may find Allies hereafter to egg them on and support them.

I need not enlarge on a Subject so well understood in this Company. Let it suffice then for me to say, that it is not the Interest of the Republick to enter into a *Guaranty*, which may involve her with the powerfullest maritime Nation in the North. She may suffer, but can't possibly gain by such a Compliment as is required of us. *H—r* is a Neighbour that can never be of Use to us,
unless

unless the King of P——a should take it in his Head to quarrel with us? And I am morally sure, that in such case, a H——n Minister would post as fast to *Berlin*, to beg a *Neutrality*, as Baron —— lately flew to *Paris* to supplicate for one.

But tho' I am satisfied that the *Guaranty* for the E——e is the principal Object in the View of those from whom the *Overture* comes, I must freely own that it is the least in mine. That Part of the Proposal, regarding an *offensive Alliance against France*, merits much more our Attention on this Side of the Water, whatever may be thought on the other, where every other consideration seems to be merged in that for H——r alone. This Point seems to me of so high Importance, that I shall endeavour to discuss it with all due Caution and Regard. But before I proceed to shew our Reasons for not agreeing to the Proposals made to us, indulge me with mentioning those for which, I think, it is now made with so uncommon Eagerness and Warmth.

The *late Minister* having been universally condemned for stooping to *French Influence*, it was thought necessary that his *Successors* should shew that they were Men of higher Mettle and more exalted Virtue. But as nothing could more effectually remove all Suspicion of being held in the *late Minister's* Leading-Strings, as taking, or at least affecting to be

be inclined to take young *Louis* by the Whiskers, it was resolved they should assume a *strutting* Air, stamp the Foot at the old *Cardinal*, call him hard Names, and tell him he must be civil or he——what? Why, that the simple *Dutch* would be forced, if they proved wise enough to see the Fallacy, to join against *France* in spite of their Teeth: That the best Troops of *B——n* would be transported, though slowly to *Flanders*; that even the bold *Hanoverians* would march thither; and that sacred *M——y* itself would quit his——and his Ease to prove the high Courage and Ability of the *late Comers*——Here was the Scheme; and it must be owned it was specious and artful.

Who could imagine that there was no Intention of a Rupture with *France*, when so many Engines should appear at work for tearing her to pieces? Who could suspect a *Court* of having absolutely determined never to break with *France*, unless she should attempt an Invasion in favour of the *P——r* who should send one of her principal *Nobles* to press and bully the *States General* into an offensive Alliance against that Crown? Who could suppose any Deceit when an encumbered Nation is put to a vast Expence in transporting the Flower of their Forces to a Country, which must be enriched at their Expence? Who could have so much as a Jealousy, that a Ministry was not in earnest, when
their

their Country, already groaning under the Weight of Debts, Taxes, and Decay of Trade, should have the additional Burden of 16000 *Hanoverians* and 6000 *Hessians* flung upon her; and above a *Million* of her Coin sent Abroad to pay and maintain the national Troops? Who could suppose, that Artillery, Field-Equipage, every thing proper for the Campaign of a great Prince, should be shipped off, with no other View in the World, than to amuse a deluded People at Home, and some other credulous Princes Abroad?

The Scheme was well concerted, and executed so speciously, that all *Europe* begun to think that a Rupture would necessarily ensue; but, my L—ds, we of this State had quite another Idea of the late Preparations of your Country. We saw, as has been observed, a New Ministry under an absolute Necessity of appearing to swerve from the Measures of the *Minister*, become universally hated, more from his cringing Subserviency to the House of *Bourbon*, than even to his Corruption, and Profuseness of Publick Money. We soon discerned the Drift of those hostile Preparations, which so much employed the Thoughts of the Politicians of *Europe*, and diverted those of the Subject at Home from observing that the Cabinet was still influenced by the late *Minister*, and that the *new Comers* had servilely adopted all his Maxims. We could perceive the *new Ministers* implicitly bowing

to every *Desire* of the Court for requiring Power, but still covering themselves under the Shelter of succouring the Queen of *Hungary* and distressing *France*.

We saw, my L——ds, your Court, as most Courts are, enamoured more with the Power of doing Harm than Good. We saw her all along grasping at all that could make her dreaded at Home, and slighting all that might acquire her the Confidence and Affection of the People. This was the Light we viewed your Court in, when we heard of your Embarkations for *Flanders*; nor did we alter our Opinion when you urged us so eagerly to act jointly with you against *France*. Even now, we see no Reason for altering our Sentiments.

Your War with *Spain*, and those in *Germany*, gave your C——t a fair Pretence of augmenting her native *Land Forces* beyond what the Nation had on foot during the late War with *France*. But as the People must see with great Jealousy, so extraordinary an armed Force within their Bowels, it was necessary to transport part of this dreaded Army out of Sight; but however to send it at so little a Distance as to be within call, should the national Discontent rise to a Flame that should require an Exertion of Power to quench it.

The sending Part of your Army into *Flanders*, gave a Colour to the bringing a
large

large Body of *Hanoverians* so near to *B—n*, that in a few Hours they may be made as useful as if they had been quartered in the Heart of the Kingdom. To bring these Foreign Troops so near as *Flanders*, without such a specious Pretext as attacking *France*, would raise too great Distrust in *B—n*; nor was the Pretence less necessary for appeasing the Clamour of a burthened People for being saddled with the Pay of the Troops of the *E——e*. It might be expected that the *E——e* ought rather to ease *B—n* than add to her Burthen; and that as the War in the Empire affected *H——r* infinitely more than *G. B.* it became the *E——e* to defray the Expence of its own Troops at least. It might be asked, by a People that had paid *Millions* to secure and enlarge the *E——e* since the *A——n*, why *H——r* did not supply the Queen of *Hungary* with the Quota of 4000 Men the *E——e* was obliged to by Treaty? Several more Interrogatories might be put by *B——ns*, not much to the Credit of the *C——t*, if their Attention had not been diverted by the Hurry of Embarkations, and the Hopes of wintering at *Paris*; and particularly of destroying the Harbour and Works at *Dunkirk*.

How infinite are the Pains that have been taken by the *new Ministry* to raise our Jealousy of *France* on account of that dismantled Town: But the Scheme for encreasing the Power

Power of the *Court*, and deluding the Nation, after the Manner of the *late Minister*, had been imperfect without this Alarm about *Dunkirk*. No Preparation more specious and popular, than that for attacking and destroying a Port so near, and so great an Eye-Sore to the commercial Part of the Subject. But the Farce was carried farther than Home; I suppose it was necessary that it should. The Alarm was given to this Republick in every *Memorial*, and at every Conference, as if we had been ignorant of the State of that Port and Town. These Memorials and Conferences, echoed back to *London*, might be expedient towards amusing People at Home; they might strengthen the Colour for arming at Home, and bring the *Hanoverians*, at the Expence of *B——n*, within call of the Island. The Mention made of *Dunkirk* in these Memorials, might strengthen the Pretext for influencing the *P——t* the next Sessions, to encrease the *Subsidies* of the last Year; and continue the present standing Force.

We can perceive many more Reasons, which the *new Ministry* might have for alarming us here with that Town, but we can see no manner of Reason for taking the Alarm, unless it be to humour a Set of Men that have, in no one Instance, answered our Hopes or *Expectations*. We know that the Port of *Dunkirk* is not bettered in any respect, since the Death of *G. the first*. It was then
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capable of receiving small Merchant Ships with Risk and Danger ; but quite incapable of Ships of War. The Case is still the same : Therefore what Colour or Foundation for this late Jealousy and Bustle ? There are certainly none at this Time, with regard to the *Port*, that did not subsist twenty Years ago ; and with regard to *Fortifications*, what is the Foundation of the present Out-cry from the other Side of the Water ? You thunder out Vengeance from Court, from the Senate, from the whole People ; the destruction of that *Town* is threatened universally, and yet you wonder that *France* raises some few Batteries on the Sea-Coast to prevent a Surprise. You proclaim every where, that you design to employ your Forces in the *Netherlands* against that open Town, and yet you are surprized that Trenches are raised to cover it. You give Cause for the Jealousy which obliges *France* to arm on that Side, and you would make her arming a Pretext for drawing us into an offensive Alliance against her ; like the fat Burgher who press'd out of a narrow Door, thro' a Crowd, and cry'd out all the way as he went, *Lord ! that People will be so cruel as to squeeze a poor sickly Man to Death*, when all the while he himself was the sole Occasion of the Pressure he complained of.

This Clamour about *Dunkirk* may be useful to the *New Ministry* to cover their *Submission*.

mission to the *Minister*, whom but a few Weeks before, they profess'd to contemn and detest; it may be necessary towards lulling a supine, forgiving People into a fatal Security; but, my noble L—ds, 'tis quite unnecessary on this Side of the Water, unless it be that it may be echoed back to the other, for the Purposes I have already mentioned. We are acquainted with the true Situation of the Place; we knew every Motion of the *French* to secure it; and this certain Knowledge we have of what passes there, creates such a Security, as no Outcry from your Side of the Water, shall ever destroy or disturb. Had there been a real Foundation for the Outcry; had there been a real Intention to attack *France* on that Side, the way to secure Success was not to proclaim such a Design; but *Dunkirk*, like the poor deluded Queen of *Hungary*, was taken into the general Scheme of securing the *New Ministry*, enlarging the Power of the Court, and preventing an effectual Enquiry into the Conduct of the *late Minister*. These may be cogent Reasons with the Cabinet of L——n; but I will be so plain as to declare, that they have no kind of Weight here at the *Hague*, where we are not unacquainted with the Views of the Court of B——n, to aggrandize H——r, and fix Power on the Ruins of *Liberty*.

I have made a cursory Mention of the Mo-

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tives, which, I think, induce the Court of L—n to press us so earnestly into an offensive Alliance against France; I shall now endeavour to point out our Motives for declining to contract any Engagement that seems to threaten the Tranquility of the Republick.

I have taken some Pains to trace out the Conduct of the *late Minister*, in order to shew that the Republick could, with no Safety imaginable, contract with, or rely on the Court of L—n, whilst he was at the Helm: And I have observed succinctly on the Conduct of the *New Ministry*, and compared it with the late, that it might be seen whether or no the Reasons still subsist, which induced the *States* to harbour a Diffidence of the *Virtue* and *Wisdom* of their ancient Allies. If the Conduct be the same, as it seems to me evident that it is, the same Reasons still subsist, for our distrusting the Court of L—n at present, as much as during the public Influence of the *late Minister*; and that the Conduct of the late and present *Ministries* is the same, appears, I think manifestly from the Consequences. For instance; the *late Minister* was obnoxious to the whole Nation, his Pensioners excepted; Are his Successors more belov'd? The late Minister, screened all the Delinquents of his Party, and corrupted all that were susceptible of Corruption;

on; Have his Successors screen'd or corrupted none? The *late Minister* sacrificed the Treasure, the Power, the Honour of his Country, and *Freedom* of his Countrymen to a *Foreign Concern*, in order to acquire *Confidence*, and continue his own Influence: What have his Successors done, that shews they have swerved in a Tittle from his Self-interested Maxims? The late Minister's bad Conduct and his R——l M——r's Support of him, produced Murmurs, Jealousies, Discontent, some will say disaffect——; have his *Successors* taken any Pains to calm the Minds of the People; or are they less discontented, or more reconciled to these than to him? As the Conduct was the same, so do we find the Consequences to be. The same Ill-blood at Home, the same Distrust abroad; the same Measures, the same Maxims, the same dangerous and unsafe Politicks followed in this, as in that Administration.

My L—ds, at the Time that we engaged with B——n last, against *France*, there were no Divisions, no Discontent that could possibly obstruct a vigorous Prosecution of that just and necessary War. The Queen was beloved; she had not a single Enemy within her extended Dominions; she had no Interest separate from her People; and they believed so, having hourly Proofs of her Tenderness for them. We hope the present Prince is e-

qually beloved, not doubting that he is equally human and bountiful ; but we are sure his *Ministry* are neither as beloved or esteem'd as *Queen Anne's* were. In those Days your Debts were not great, and your Taxes were moderate ; your Trade was beneficial ; your Industry was quick ; your Luxury was a Pigmy, if compared with what it is at present. Sure I need not shew how greatly the Scene is altered of late. I need not be at the Pains of pointing out what every one here knows ; what all *Europe* knows.

We cannot but see, what all the World sees, that *B——n* has neither *S——n* to direct her Councils, nor *G——ls* to fight her Battles *except your L——ps*. We can't avoid seeing the Decrease of her Trade, the Weight of her Taxes, her Luxury, and her Debts, which might have been paid off before now ; and we must be infatuated not to perceive, that she is infinitely in a worse Plight at this Time than when we entered into an Offensive Alliance with *Queen Anne*.

In those Days we could rely on the Wisdom of *B——n*, her Steadiness, and Regard for the Liberty of *Europe*, and the *Protestant* Interest ; but can we do so now, after so many repeated Tests of her bad Conduct ? Can we shut our Eyes to her Conduct towards her natural Allies, since the Death of that excellent *Princess*, who was the Soul of the late

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general Alliance? Have we not seen the late *Emperor*, the Princes of the *Empire*, the King of *Sardinia*, and this *Republick* slighted always, often irritated, whilst servile Court was paid to *France*? Have we not seen the natural Interest of *B——n*, in every Instance, sacrificed to a determined *Design* of aggrandizing *H——r* and becoming powerful in the *Empire*? Have we not observed every Administration bow to the private Views, the Humour and the Foibles of *Man*, in Violation of their Love and Duty to their Country? Could we, or did you yourselves, my L—ds, perceive any the least Traces of either *Patriotism* or *Wisdom* in the Conduct of your Cabinet for near the third Part of a Century?

The fatal Consequences of so mistaken a Conduct, are too visible to be overlooked. We see them with that sincere Concern which Friendship dictates. We see a divided, discontented People overburthened with Taxes, groaning under the Pressure of Debts, Decay of Trade, Luxury, and Penal Laws. We see this People not long ago the Terror of Tyranny, and delight of the Virtuous, now become the Object of general Scorn and Derision. Such are the dire Consequences of a Series of Blunders and false Politicks.

You may perceive, my L—ds, from what I have said of the Conduct of your Cabinet, and the Situation of your Country, that I
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don't hold it prudent or safe for this Republick to embrace the Overtures you are pleased to make to us. I observed, that it may be necessary for the *new Ministry* to seem inclined to a War with *France*, but that in reality they never intended it. But supposing, that the Tongue had spoke the Sentiments of the Heart, how unfaithful should we be to our Mother-Country, should we involve her in an *unjust Quarrel* to sooth the present peevish Humour of *those* whose Misconduct has precipitated a daring, powerful, faithful Nation into? Irresolution, Poverty and Perfidy? Can we venture on your Councils or your Efforts in the Prosecution of a *French War*, when we see how you have misapplied your Force, and your Time in carrying on your present War with *Spain*. To embark the Republick in an expensive dangerous War, in Conjunction with a divided, discontented, debilitated, burthened, ill-conducted Nation, would be a Weakness, removed, but by a very slender Partition, from Madness. Forbid it, Heaven! that the Servants of the State should be Enemies and Betrayers of the Republick.

We cannot see the Danger or Injustice of the Alliance of *France* with *Bavaria*. We can't see that the Balance of Power would be affected, should the *Queen of Hungary* part with one of her Provinces to content the Emperor,

peror, who has a Claim to more; nor do I see why it should be more unjust in *France* to assist the present Emperor, than it is for *Britain* to aid the Queen of *Hungary*. It is the Interest of *Britain*, you will say; the *French* will say as much. But you will urge the late Guaranty of *France* of the *Pragmatick Sanction*. That there was such a Guaranty specified in the *Definitive Treaty*, concluded between the late Emperor and *France* in 1735, is very true; but it is as certain, that that Treaty was never ratified, for Reasons solely owing to the Politicks of the Cabinet of *Vienna*.

I would not have it thought that I am an Advocate for *France*, in asserting, that I can't perceive the Justice of breaking with her, on Account of her Alliance with the Emperor. I am no Enemy to *France* whilst she remains within the Bounds of Moderation; but declare myself, as all my Colleagues do, her avowed Enemy whenever she appears to have a View to Conquest. She can have none on the Side of *Germany*; and should she ever cast a wishful Eye towards our *Barrier*, or any Part of the *Netherlands*, we think ourselves powerful enough to stay her Career, till we shall be joined by Powers, whose Interest it will be to check the Flight of that Crown.

'Tis insinuated that *France* is reduced, and for that Reason we are press'd to join in worrying her. If the Fact had been true, where would

would be the Honour or the Equity of falling upon an inoffensive Man because he happens to be feeble and unarmed? Is she reduced now, she will be more so presently. The Drains upon her, both in Blood and Treasure, to *Germany* will help on her Consumption, faster in one Campaign, than a War in *Flanders* would in six. But a War in *Flanders* would set *B——n* into such a galloping Consumption, as would force her Allies to a Peace, which must turn to the Advantage of *France*. If *Britain*, who prides herself in being Empress of the Ocean, makes so miserable a hand of a War on her favourite Element, what a scurvy Figure must she make in a foreign Land-War against the power-fullest Nation in the World?

But, my L——ds, are you in earnest when you tell us that *France* is reduced? What are her Debts? I'll answer they don't amount to a fourth of what *Britain* owes. What are her Taxes? Not half what is paid in *England*. The Trade of *France* is visibly increased; that of *Britain* is obviously decreased. This Gasconade of pulling down *France*, this Eagerness to press the Republick into an offensive Alliance against that Crown, may serve the Purposes of the new *B——b* Ministry; their Measures may require such Props. But, my L——ds, the Servants of this Republick want

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no such-Aids. They have no Views, no Interest separate from the Good of their dear Country. They serve her to the best of their Skill, and the utmost of their Power. They have not, nor never will put their Country to an immense, or any *Expence*, in order to share of the Spoil, or delude their Countrymen. Had the Servants of B——n observed this wise and Patriot Maxim, since the A——n, their Country would be at this Time as powerful as she is otherwise, and *France* as reduced as she is falsely painted to be.

To put an End to this Conference, which we hope will be the last on the present Subject, I must freely declare, that the Conduct of B——n all along, has been such as would deter us from entering into new Contracts with her, supposing we thought her in earnest. But as there is room for believing that all her late Bustle and Outcry are calculated to serve certain *domestick* Purposes, we desire to be excused from having any hand in countenancing *ministerial* Collusion. We have so augmented our Forces that we are in no Dread of *France* or any other Power. The Neutrality of the *Netherlands* is so much our Interest: 'tis so much the Interest of *Europe*, that we are resolved to preserve it at all Hazards. Therefore, my L—ds, to convince you of our Candour, we plainly tell you that we shall look upon those who commit Hostilities in the *Netherlands*, as Enemies to the Republic

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lick, and treat them as such to the utmost of
 our Power, Your L——ds, will be pleased
 to look upon this as the final Answer to the
 Proposals you have made us from your Court.
 I am now to beg your L——d's Pardon for
 having taken up so much of your Time, and
 particularly for my Harshness of Expression,
 to which the Nature of my Subject obliged
 me.

F I N I S.

